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The processing of sequentially presented numerical information is a prerequisite for
decisions from experience, where people learn about potential outcomes and their
associated probabilities and then make choices between gambles. Little is known,
however, about how people's preference for choosing a gamble is affected by how
they perceive and process numerical information. To address this, we conducted a
series of experiments wherein participants repeatedly sampled numbers from contin-
uous outcome distributions. They were incentivized either to estimate the means of
the numbers or to state their minimum selling prices to forgo a consequential draw
from the distributions (i.e., the certainty equivalents or valuations). We found that
participants valued distributions below their means, valued high-variance sequences
lower than low-variance sequences, and valued left-skewed sequences lower than
right-skewed sequences. Though less pronounced, similar patterns occurred in the
mean estimation task where preferences should not play a role. These results are not
consistent with prior findings in decision from experience such as the overweight-
ing of high numbers and the underweighting of rare events. Rather, the qualitative
effects, as well as the similarity of effects in valuation and estimation, are consistent
with the assumption that people process numbers on a compressed mental number
line in valuations from experience.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
In many real-world situations, people experience decision outcomes
over time. In an economic context, decision makers must integrate
numerical information such as returns on investments that accrue
sequentially. In experimental research, this scenario is modeled using
the decisions from experience (DFEs) paradigm (Hertwig et al. 2004;
Barron & Erev, 2003; Weber et al. 2004), where people can freely
sample from an outcome distribution and afterward make a conse-
quential choice. This contrasts with the decisions from description
(DFD) paradigm, where all relevant information is readily summarized.
Recently, there has been debate about whether economic behav-
ior in DFD can be explained partly by regularities in the perception
of numeric information (Schley & Peters, 2014; Bordalo et al. 2012;
Woodford, 2020). Yet the extent to which this could also be the case
in DFE, where understanding a choice option requires the perception,
memorization, and integration of sequential numeric information, is an
open question.
Prior research on DFE comprised mostly studies with choices
between one- or two-outcome gambles. In this study, we broaden the
scope to subjective valuations (or certainty equivalents) of continuous
number streams and examine how they compare with choice behavior
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reported in DFE. In addition, we compare these valuations to objec-
tive mean judgments to examine whether behavioral patterns extend
to nonpreferential tasks. Whereas preferential valuations are usually
subject to risk and skewness preferences, mean estimates should not
be affected by these preferences. To the extent that numeric informa-
tion is similarly processed in both objective estimation and subjective
valuation tasks, behavioral patterns should be similar in both tasks.
However, to the extent that risk and skewness preferences drive sub-
jective valuations but not objective estimations, responses in valuation
should differ from those in the estimation task. In the following, we
develop specific hypotheses that are rooted in existing findings in the
literature.
1.1 Underweighting of rare events
and overweighting of high outcomes
Past research in DFE suggests that people choose as if they under-
weight rare events (Hertwig et al. 2004). Although this effect may be
partly due to undersampling of the rare event (Fox & Hadar, 2006), a
recent meta-analysis found that the effect remains when controlling
for undersampling (Wulff et al. 2018). Another important finding is
that people are risk seeking in DFE, which suggests that participants
overweight high outcomes (Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). This overweight-
ing has been corroborated by higher frequency judgments for higher
numbers in the gain domain (Madan et al. 2014, 2016).
So far, underweighting of rare events and overweighting of high
outcomes have been tested predominantly on choices for gambles
with one or two discrete outcomes. Using valuations of continuous
outcome sequences, however, allows us to test the generalizability of
these effects and provides a bridge to the numeric cognition literature.
For symmetric distributions like the normal distribution, rare events
are equally likely to occur for high and low outcomes. Thus, under-
weighting of rare events predicts no valuations below the mean and
no effect of the variance on valuations. In skewed distributions, rare
events are more likely to occur on one side of the distribution. Hence,
if all other characteristics are equal, underweighting of rare events
predicts lower valuations for right-skewed distributions (where high
values are rare) than for left-skewed distributions (where low values
are rare). In contrast, overweighting of high outcomes predicts higher
valuations than the mean, and higher valuations for high-variance (than
for low variance) and right-skewed (than for left skewed) distributions,
again if all other characteristics are equal.
1.2 Numeric cognition and the compressed mental
number line
Important contributions have been made to the better understanding
of how people process and integrate information sequentially (e.g.,
Ashby & Rakow, 2014; Baucells et al. 2011; Hotaling et al. 2019; Wulff
& Pachur, 2016). However, most of this research has not connected to
number perception research directly. To bridge this gap, we develop
a hypothesis for valuations from experience from the perspective of
numeric cognition.
People have an inherently imprecise and nonverbal notion of
numerosity (Cheyette & Piantadosi, 2019; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000;
Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Whalen et al. 1999). Research by Dehaene
and colleagues (Dehaene, 2003; Dehaene et al. 2008; Feigenson et al.
2004) has indicated that the internal representation of numerals can
be described as a compressed mental number line. This means that
differences in numerosity are represented to be smaller for higher
numerosity, similar to concave mappings from objective stimuli to
subjective perceptions in other domains (see Fechner, 1860).
For the processing of number sequences, the compressed mental
number line predicts that people give lower estimations, and hence also
lower valuations, than the true mean of the underlying distribution.
Further, it predicts that both estimation and valuation are lower for
sequences with higher variance. In this case, apparent risk-averse
behavior would be partly due to numeric perception rather than
subjective economic preference (Schoemaker, 1982). Furthermore, it
can be shown mathematically that for compressed power functions,
sequence means are higher for right- than for left-skewed distributions
(Genest et al. 2016; Menezes et al. 1980). This implies that people
also value right-skewed distributions higher than left-skewed ones
and that seeming skewness preferences could be rooted partly in the
perception of numbers.
The empirical evidence for a compressed mental number line when
integrating symbolic number sequences is mixed. Whereas some stud-
ies have reported that people have a tendency to underestimate
the mean or the sum of a number sequence (Brezis et al. 2015;
Scheibehenne, 2019), others have found no such effect (e.g., Lindskog
& Winman, 2014; Peterson & Beach, 1967). Consequently, it is an
open question if and under what circumstances a compressed men-
tal number line applies when integrating symbolic continuous number
sequences.
1.3 Summary of hypotheses
All other characteristics being equal, underweighting of rare events
predicts an economic preference for left- over right-skewed distri-
butions and risk neutrality for symmetrically distributed gambles. In
contrast, overweighting of high numbers predicts a preference for
right-skewed over left-skewed gambles and risk seeking for gains.
Finally, the compressed mental number line predicts overall risk aver-
sion and a preference for right-skewed over left-skewed gambles.
These predictions are summarized in Table 1.
To systematically test these predictions, we conducted a series of
experiments in which participants repeatedly sampled outcomes from
continuous payoff distributions that differed in their mean, variance,
and skewness. For each distribution, participants were incentivized




The experiment consisted of economic valuation and numeric esti-
mation tasks in a within-subjects design. Before giving their answer,
participants could freely sample outcomes from an underlying distri-
bution. In the valuation task, participants were asked to state their
minimum selling prices (willingness-to-accept) or certainty equivalent
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Underweighting of Overweighting of Compressed mental
rare events high numbers number line
Symmetric distribution 0 + −
Effect of variance 0 + −
Effect of skewness − + +
Note: Behavioral predictions based on findings in decision from experience (DFE) and numeric
cognition on the valuation of a continuous number sequence. Key: 0 means no deviation
from the mean or no effect, + means a positive deviation from the mean or a positive effect,
and − means a negative deviation from the mean or a negative effect. For details, see text.
TABLE 1 Predictions for valuations from experience
for each distribution. This was explained to them as the minimum price
they would demand to forgo the option to make a single consequential
draw from that distribution that would be paid out. In the estimation
task, participants were asked to estimate the mean of the distribu-
tion. Here, accuracy was incentivized with respect to how closely the
estimates matched the theoretical mean of the underlying distribution.
Under the assumption that participants were well calibrated to the
mean estimation task, the variability of the monetary bonus should
have been higher in the valuation than in the estimation task. However,
we believe that this is at the core of the difference between the two
tasks and that other incentives of the estimation task would have
made answers subject to risk preferences.
Each trial contained a rectangular box representing the underlying
outcome distribution. Participants could sample from the distribution
by pressing <space>. Each sampled number was shown for 250 ms
and was generated as a random draw from the respective underlying
distribution, rounded to its nearest integer. Participants had to draw at
least one sample before they typed their answers into the gray fields
and confirmed their inputs with <enter> (see Figure 1 for a schematic).
2.1.2 Distributions
We constructed 24 continuous number distributions by combining
four means (80, 100, 130, and 160), two standard deviations (5 and
10), and three distribution shapes (normal, left skewed, and right
skewed). Skewed distributions were constructed from scaled gamma
distributions with a shape parameter of 1 (absolute skewness=2) and
were truncated at the first (left skewed) or last (right skewed) percentile
to avoid extreme outliers. The different distributions were presented
in randomized order and were the same in both the valuation and the
estimation tasks.
2.1.3 Procedure and incentives
The experiment was implemented on a computer with PsychoPy
(Peirce, 2007) and conducted in individual sessions in separate rooms
at the University of New South Wales School of Psychology. All
instructions were presented on the computer screen and could be read
at a participant's own pace. Each participant completed two blocks of
24 tasks, starting with either estimations or valuations.
Payment was determined by randomly selecting one answer
across both blocks. If the trial was in the valuation block,
a Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) procedure was implemented
(Becker et al. 1964): a random number was uniformly drawn between
zero and the theoretical mean of a given distribution. When the ran-
dom number was below the participant's answer for this trial, the
participant received a draw from the distribution; otherwise, the par-
ticipant received the points from the random number for certain. If
the selected trial was in the estimation block, the observed points
were determined by the true mean from which the error of the esti-
mate was subtracted. Finally, the obtained points were exchanged for
Australian dollars (AUD) with a 20:1 ratio and paid out in cash.
2.1.4 Participants and data analysis
We tested 53 participants and determined sample size prior to data
inspection. Participants were undergraduates from the University's
subject pool, recruited via online advertisement. Participants received
course credit and a choice-dependent bonus of 1.50 to 8.93 AUD
(Mpay = 5.43 AUD). In the subject pool, the mean age was 19 years,
and approximately 70% of the subjects were women.
Prior to analyzing the data, we excluded two participants who did
not comply with the task. Further, we excluded answers more than
five standard deviations from the distribution's mean (21 out of 2448
total trials). We assumed that in these trials, participants made typos
or did not pay attention to the samples; thus, these trials were not
informative for our research question.
We analyzed the data by means of a participant mixed-effects
regression analysis in R (R Core Team, 2016; RStudio Team, 2015)
using the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and
the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Bruun Brockhoff, & Haubo Bojesen
Christensen, 2016). Across all regressions, we used the theoretical
characteristics of the respective distributions as independent variables.
We dummy-coded variance and skewness and treated the mean as
a continuous predictor variable. As dependent variables, we defined
the logarithm of sample size and participant accuracy, quantified as
the deviation of their answers proportional to the true means of the
distributions. The reason we chose this accuracy measure was to
prevent heteroscedasticity in the data, that is, to prevent high answers
from having a stronger influence on the regression results than low
answers.1
2.2 Results
On average, participants drew M = 28.27 samples from each distribu-
tion (Mdn = 21, SD = 25.62). There was no significant difference in
sample size between estimation (M = 30.38, Mdn = 23, SD = 29.95)
and valuation (M = 26.15, Mdn = 22, SD = 20.11). Participants in
1 Regression analyses based on actual samples led to qualitatively similar results and are
reported in the Supporting Information.
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FIGURE 1 Schematic for one trial in
the estimation (left) and valuation (right)
tasks in Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2.
Participants sampled from the white box
and typed their answer into the gray box.
In this example trial, the participant
sampled 127
both tasks, however, sampled more when the variance was higher
(b = 0.14, p < .001).2 This is in line with previous findings in the
literature (Ashby, 2017; Lindskog et al. 2013), and it is adaptive in
the sense that more samples mitigate higher uncertainty. Finally, the
higher the mean, the fewer the samples taken (b = −0.001, p < .01).
This effect can be explained by the decrease in relative variation with
higher means and is discussed below for valuations and estimations.
2.2.1 Valuation task
Figure 2 (left) plots the proportional deviation of participant answers
from the true means across the different distributional characteristics
in the valuation task. Participants gave certainty equivalents lower
than the true means, and the average deviation from the true mean
was M = −4.77 (Mdn = −3.13, SD = 16.28). This was corroborated by
a t test on the level of participant means, t(50) = −3.10, p = .003. To
test the robustness of this inference, we also calculated a Wilcoxon
test that led to the same conclusion (W(n = 51) = 339, p < .001).
Higher variance sequences led to lower certainty equivalents
(Mhigh = −7.04, Mdnhigh = −6.25, SDhigh = 21.49) than those of lower
variance (Mlow = −2.44, Mdnlow = −2.50, SDlow = 7.31). The left col-
umn of Table 2 shows the corresponding regression results for the
valuation task. In particular, the parameter for variance is negative
(b = −4.43, SE = 0.69), that is, higher variance led to significantly
lower valuations. Together with the result of overall undervaluation of
the mean, these results are consistent with risk-averse preferences.
Skewness also had a significant effect on economic valuations. Par-
ticipants gave lower values to left- (Mleft = −7.26, Mdnleft = −3.13,
SDleft = 17.66) than to right-skewed distributions (Mright = −2.21,
Mdnright = −3.13, SDright = 14.62). In line with this, the regression
analysis has shown that left-skewed outcome distributions were val-
2 Results are based on a mixed-effects regression with log sample size as the dependent
variable. Detailed results can be found in the Supporting Information.
ued significantly lower than normally distributed ones (b = −2.57,
SE = 0.84) and that right-skewed outcome distributions were
valued significantly higher than normally distributed ones (b = 2.60,
SE = 0.84). Thus, participants preferred right-skewed distributed
outcomes.
Finally, deviations got smaller as the mean increased (b = 0.04,
SE = 0.01). This might be because the variation relative to the mean
decreased with higher means when the variance was held constant.
We address this issue in Experiment 2.
2.2.2 Estimation task
The mean estimates within each condition are depicted in Figure 2
(right). As in the valuation task, participants underestimated the
theoretical mean of the number sequences across all distributional
characteristics (M = −1.59, Mdn = 0, SD = 9.40). A t test revealed that
this underestimation was significant, t(50) = −5.17, p < .001. Again
for robustness, we calculated a Wilcoxon test, and it led to the same
conclusion (W(n = 51) = 189, p < .001).
Underestimation was more pronounced for sequences with high
variance (Mhigh = −2.42, Mdnhigh = −1.25, SDhigh = 12.95) than for
those with low variance (Mlow = −0.76, Mdnlow = 0, SDlow = 2.81).
Variance was a significant predictor for estimation deviations in the
regression (b = −1.66, SE = 0.59; Table 2 right-middle column).
Furthermore, mean estimates for left-skewed distributions
(Mleft = −3.41, Mdnleft = −1, SDleft = 8.70) were lower than for
right-skewed distributions (Mright = 0.37, Mdnright = 0, SDright = 7.52).
The regression results revealed that mean estimates of right-skewed
distributions were significantly higher (b = 2.11, SE = 0.64), and mean
estimates of left-skewed distributions significantly lower (b = −1.68,
SE = 0.64), than mean estimates of normally distributed sequences.
Together, all these effects are in accordance with a compressed mental
number line.
Finally, the proportional deviation from the theoretical mean got
smaller with higher means (b = 0.02, SE = 0.01). As in the valuation
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FIGURE 2 Answers in Experiment 1A. The y
axis shows percentage deviation of participant
answers from the theoretical means of the
distributions. Error bars are 95% confidence
intervals
Valuation 1A Valuation 1B Estimation 1A Estimation 1B
(Intercept) −7.422*** −5.594** −3.780** −2.090
(2.119) (2.070) (1.152) (1.291)
Mean 0.041*** 0.024* 0.024** 0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
SD 20 −4.432*** −4.897*** −1.660** −0.331
(0.685) (0.687) (0.523) (0.453)
Right skewed 2.598** 3.422*** 2.108*** 1.400*
(0.838) (0.842) (0.640) (0.553)
Left skewed −2.573** −2.213** −1.675** −0.755
(0.838) (0.842) (0.640) (0.553)
Note: Effects of theoretical mean, variance, and skewness on percentage deviation
of answers from the theoretical mean in economic valuation and estimation for
Experiments 1A and 1B. All models included subject random intercepts. All signif-
icant predictors are robust to the inclusion of random slopes. Standard errors in
parentheses. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
TABLE 2 Experiments 1A and 1B: answers in valuation and
estimation tasks
task, this effect was most likely due to a decrease in relative variation
as the mean increased.
3 EXPERIMENT 1B
Experiment 1B was a direct, preregistered replication of Experiment
1A (https://osf.io/ex3dy/).
3.1 Method
The main difference was in participant instructions, as participants
in Experiment 1A indicated some difficulty in comprehending the
incentive scheme (particularly the BDM auction). Hence, in Experiment
1B, we simply instructed participants to answer thoroughly and stated
that their accuracy would influence their final payoff. We further
informed participants that details of the actual payment mechanism
were available upon clicking an extra button on the screen. About one
third of participants in each block made use of this option.
3.1.1 Participants
We tested 58 participants from the same subject pool as in Experiment
1A. Participants received course credit and a choice-dependent bonus
of 1.50 to 8.93 AUD (Mpay = 5.43 AUD). Prior to analyzing the
data, we excluded answers more than five standard deviations from
the distribution's mean (33 out of 2784 total trials) as preregistered.
We used data analyses as preregistered, and deviations were clearly
marked.
3.2 Results
On average, participants drew M = 29.29 samples from each distribu-
tion (Mdn = 19, SD = 35.49). More samples were drawn in valuation
(M = 31.71, Mdn = 20, SD = 41.71) than in estimation (M = 26.83,
Mdn = 19, SD = 27.61).3 Unlike in Experiment 1A, the mean had
no significant influence on the sample size. However, in line with
Experiment 1A, participants sampled more when variance was higher
(b = 0.18, p < .001).
3.2.1 Valuation task
Figure 3 (left) plots the proportional deviation of participant answers
from the true means in the valuation task. All effects were qualitatively
3 This effect was significant in a regular regression on individually standardized sample sizes,
but failed to reach significance in a mixed-effect regression. For details, see the Supporting
Information.
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similar to Experiment 1A. Overall, valuations were below the mean
(M = −4.80, Mdn = −3.13, SD = 17.15), lower for high- than for
low-variance sequences (Mhigh = −7.25, Mdnhigh = −6.25, SDhigh =
23.11; Mlow = −2.34, Mdnlow = −1.88, SDlow = 6.42), and lower for
left- than for right-skewed sequences (Mleft = −7.40, Mdnleft = −2.31,
SDleft = 19.86; Mright = −1.76, Mdnright = −3, SDright = 12.44). A t
test and mixed-effect regressions show that certainty equivalents
were significantly lower than the theoretical means, t(57) = −3.26,
p = .002,4 and higher variance led to significantly lower valuations
(b = −4.90, SE = 0.69). In addition, left-skewed outcome distributions
were valued lower than normally distributed ones (b = −2.21, SE =
0.84), and right-skewed outcome distributions were valued higher
than normally distributed ones (b = 3.42, SE = 0.84). Finally, the
mean again had a significantly positive effect (b = 0.02, SE = 0.01) on
participant valuations.
3.2.2 Estimation task
Figure 3 (right) plots the proportional deviation of participant answers
from the true means in the estimation task. All effects trended in the
same directions as in Experiment 1A and as in the valuation task. In
particular, overall mean estimations were below the mean (M = −1.22,
Mdn = 0, SD = 9.72), lower for high- than low-variance sequences
(Mhigh = −2.07, Mdnhigh = −0.77, SDhigh = 13.12; Mlow = −0.70,
Mdnlow = 0, SDlow = 3.01), and lower for left- than for right-skewed
sequences (Mleft = −2.17, Mdnleft = 0, SDleft = 9.03; Mright = −0.04,
Mdnright = 0, SDright = 10.85). However, the mean deviation in estima-
tion was only marginally significantly lower than zero, t(57) = −1.80,
p = .078, 5 and higher variance had no significant effect (b = −0.33,
SE = 0.45). Whereas left-skewed distributions were not estimated sig-
nificantly lower than normal ones (b = −0.75, SE = 0.55), right-skewed
distributions were estimated significantly higher than normal ones
(b = 1.40, SE = 0.55). Finally, the mean had no significant effect on
participant estimates (b = 0.004, SE = 0.007).
3.3 Discussion of Experiments 1A and 1B
Experiment 1A and its replication in Experiment 1B showed robust
effects of overall undervaluation as well as lower valuations for high
versus low variance and lower valuations for left- versus right-skewed
distributions. These findings refute the idea that rare events are
underweighted in the context of continuous outcome distributions, in
that, if people underweighted rare events, they would value left- more
than right-skewed distributions. The evidence for overweighting high
numbers is mixed. The overweighting of high numbers is consistent
with higher valuations for right- than for left-skewed distributions,
but it is not in line with overall risk-averse valuations. Finally, all these
effects align with the predictions of a compressed mental number line.
The qualitative effects in the estimation task were similar to those
in the valuation task. In particular, the positive effect of skewness on
estimations was robust in Experiments 1A and 1B. Presumably due to
4 For robustness, we also report the result of a Wilcoxon test: W(n = 58) = 465, p = .003.
5 For robustness, we also report the result of a Wilcoxon test that was not preregistered:
W(n = 58) = 541, p = .015.
a smaller effect size, underestimation of the mean and the influence
of variance on estimations was not always significant.
Surprisingly, increasing the mean led to less undervaluation and
trended toward less underestimation, which was not in line with any
of the theories reviewed above. A possible confound could be that
we kept the variances of the underlying distributions constant across
all mean levels. Thus, there was proportionally less variation for high-
than for low-mean sequences (see also Whalen et al. 1999; Weber
et al. 2004). To further clarify these issues, we conducted another
experiment, outlined next.
4 EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 aims to clarify the influence of the absolute variance
versus the coefficient of variation (relative to the EV) on valuations and
estimations (Weber et al. 2004). Therefore, in contrast to the previous
experiments, we held the coefficient of variation constant over a
wide range of EVs. We also increased the number of participants to
clarify the ambiguous effects of overall underestimation and of lower
estimates for high variance.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Material
We made several changes from the previous experiments. We con-
structed distributions by holding the coefficient of variation (standard
deviation/mean) constant across different mean levels. We introduced
three variation levels (5%, 10%, and 20%) and eight mean levels (30,
50, 75, 100, 130, 160, 200, and 250). To keep from inflating the num-
ber of trials, we omitted the skewness manipulation. Finally, we drew
the offer for the BDM auction in the valuation task from 0% to the
99% quantile of the respective distribution.
4.1.2 Participants and procedure
We recruited 120 participants from the University of Geneva subject
pool. We determined the sample size before the start of the experiment
and doubled it from the previous experiments to increase power.
The experiment was conducted on single computer workstations and
lasted 30 min on average. The participants' average age was 23 years
(Mdn = 22, SD = 5.65), with 40 males and 80 females. In addition to
the show-up fee of 20 CHF, the average choice-dependent bonus was
approximately 6 CHF, range = [1.05;18.25].
4.2 Results
We excluded trials in which responses were more than five standard
deviations from the true mean. In contrast to the previous experi-
ments, we also excluded six participants with more than five such
trials in either condition, as such behavior indicates a general misun-
derstanding. However, all reported effects were robust even when the
trials of these participants that were within five standard deviations
were included.
On average, participants drew M = 28.68 samples from each distri-
bution (Mdn = 20, SD = 29.40). There was no difference in sample size
between task types (estimation: M = 29.86, Mdn = 20, SD = 29.68,
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FIGURE 3 Answers in Experiment 1B. The y
axis shows percentage deviation of participant
answers from the theoretical means of the
distributions. Error bars are 95% confidence
intervals
valuation: M = 27.50, Mdn = 20, SD = 29.06). Similar to the pre-
vious experiments, sample size increased with the variation (10%:
b = 0.09, SE = 0.01, 20%: b = 0.16, SE = 0.02, each compared to 5%
variation). In contrast to the previous experiments, sample size also
increased with higher means (b = 0.0007, SE = 0.0001). We attribute
the latter effect to the change in design to hold the coefficient of
variation, rather than the variance, constant across mean levels.
4.2.1 Valuation task
Figure 4 (left) plots the proportional deviation of participant answers
from the true means in the valuation task. Participants gave certainty
equivalents lower than the true means. The average deviation from
the theoretical mean was M = −5.34 (Mdn = −2.80, SD = 13.63). A
t test (t(113) = −6.05, p < .001) and a Wilcoxon test (W(n = 114)
p < .001) showed that certainty equivalents were significantly lower
than the theoretical means.
Higher variation relative to the mean led to lower certainty equiv-
alents than for sequences with lower variation (5%: M = −1.71,
Mdn = 0, SD = 4.92; 10%: M = −3.06, Mdn = −1.33, SD = 9.39; 20%:
M = −5.22, Mdn = −2.67, SD = 16.34). Regression results (middle
column of Table 3) showed that variation was a significant negative
predictor for the two higher levels of variation (10%: b = −1.96,
SE = 0.46, 20%: −5.51, SE = 0.46).
Because we explicitly manipulated variation, we can now differen-
tiate the effect of variation from the effect of higher means. There
was no significant effect of the mean level (b = 0.001, SE = 0.002) on
participant valuations. This indicates that the effect of the mean on
valuation that we found previously was, indeed, due to the confound
with the variance.
4.2.2 Estimation task
The proportional deviations of the mean estimates are depicted in
Figure 4 (right). With increased power, we replicated the finding
of Experiment 1A that participants underestimated the theoretical
mean of the number sequences across all distributions (M = −1.34,
Mdn = 0, SD = 8.03). Both a t test (t(113) = −4.42, p < .001) and
a Wilcoxon test (W(n = 114) = 1383, p < .001) revealed significant
underestimation.
TABLE 3 Experiment 2: answers in valuation and
estimation tasks





Variation 10% −1.96*** −0.68
(0.46) (0.35)
Variation 20% −5.51*** −1.40***
(0.46) (0.35)
Note: Effects of theoretical mean and variance on per-
centage deviation of answers from the theoretical mean
in economic valuation and estimation. All models include
subject random intercepts. All significant predictors are
robust to the inclusion of random slopes. Standard errors
in parentheses. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
Similarly, we found that higher variation relative to the mean led
to lower estimates (5%: M = −0.65, Mdn = 0, SD = 3.55; 10%: M =
−1.31, Mdn = 0, SD = 7.06; 20%: M = −2.06, Mdn = 0, SD = 11.37).
Regression results (right column of Table 3) show that variation was a
negative predictor for the highest level of variation (10%: b = −0.68,
SE = 0.35, 20%: b = −1.40, SE = 0.35).
As in the valuation task, the proportional deviation from the theoret-
ical mean was not affected by higher means (b = 0.0001, SE = 0.002).
Again, this indicates that the effect of the mean on estimation in
Experiment 1A was spurious.
4.3 Discussion of Experiment 2
We replicated all effects in valuations that aligned with the predic-
tions of a compressed mental number line with a higher number of
participants. Furthermore, when we held the coefficient of variation
constant, the mean did not influence valuation or estimation. This
shows that the coefficient of variation, and not absolute variance
alone, affected valuations (Weber et al. 2004).
Moreover, we replicated the main effect of overall underestima-
tion and the effect of lower estimations for distributions with higher
variation, as reported in Experiment 1A, with a higher number of par-
8 OLSCHEWSKI ET AL.
FIGURE 4 Answers in Experiment 2. The y axis
shows percentage deviation of participant
answers from the theoretical means of the
distributions. The legend refers to the means of
the distributions. Error bars are 95% confidence
intervals
ticipants. Together with the skewness effect replicated in Experiment
1B, the observed pattern in the estimation task is robust and qualita-
tively similar to the pattern of the valuation task. This shows that the
observed behavior extends qualitatively from preferential to nonpref-
erential tasks. The compressed mental number line hypothesis—which
is not based on preferences—is consistent with this observation.
5 EXPERIMENTS 3A AND 3B
In the previous studies, the number of samples from each distribution
was determined by the participants themselves. Although this aligns
with the typical experimental design in the DFE literature, possible
behavioral effects in estimation and valuation could be influenced
by the number of samples or endogenous stopping. For example,
if participants stop sampling after seeing an extremely low number
in a left-skewed distribution, this could (partly) cause the effect of
skewness on estimation and valuation. To control for these effects,
we employed a fixed sampling design where every participant saw the
same number of samples for every number sequence.
Experiment 3A aimed to better understand if and how numeric
cognition affects economic valuation. Therefore, we included one
condition where we told participants the true mean of the sam-
pled distribution prior to their valuation and another condition where
participants first made an estimation and then a valuation directly
afterwards. If number perception and integration directly affect valu-
ation, then knowing the (unbiased) mean should lead to less negative
deviations from the mean than in the condition where participants
have only their (biased) mean estimate available. Likewise, if number
perception and integration affect estimation and valuation similarly,
then valuation answers should correlate with answers in the previous
estimation task.
Experiment 3B further examined the hypothesis that individuals
have a tendency to simultaneously underestimate and undervalue
the observed outcome distributions. Additionally, we assessed the
influence of individual numeracy ability on underestimation and
undervaluation. In Experiment 3B, estimations and valuations were
both based on the same sequences, but unlike Experiment 3A, the
sequences were presented in different blocks. Both experiments
were preregistered (https://osf.io/76t9y and https://osf.io/tgrm6). All
details of the methods and the complete results can be found in the
Supporting Information.
5.1 Method
In both Experiments 3A and 3B, participants drew the fixed number of
20 samples from each distribution. Participants were recruited online
via Prolific (n = 131 and n = 133). For the payment of the valuation
task, the BDM offer was randomly drawn from the lowest outcome to
the highest outcome of the selected sequence.
Sequences in Experiment 3A varied in mean (80–120), standard
deviation (10 vs. 20), and skewness (−2.5 vs. 0 vs. +2.5). There were
two experimental conditions: in one, participants estimated the mean
before making a valuation; in the other, participants were told the true
mean before making a valuation.
In Experiment 3B, only normally distributed sequences were pre-
sented. These distributions had similar variance but different means.
At the end, participants completed the Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely
et al. 2012), which consisted of four questions about calculation with
probability.
5.2 Results and discussion
Using a fixed sampling design, Experiment 3A replicated the effects
of underestimation and undervaluation, as well as the negative effect
of variance and the positive effect of skewness, in both tasks. This
showed that previous results did not depend on motivated sampling or
endogenous sample size. Undervaluation was less pronounced when
the true mean was known than when it was unknown (M = −0.37%,
Mdn = −0.28%, SD = 11.34%; regression: b = −6.21, p < .001).
Knowing the mean led to less undervaluation by about 3.39% of that
in the condition where the mean was not known. In addition, the
deviation in the estimation condition predicted the deviation in the
following valuation, b = 0.62, p < .001. As a limitation, these effects
might also have been driven by the fact that valuation followed directly
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after true-mean presentation or estimation, which may have set an
anchor for the valuation.
In Experiment 3B, we again replicated the effects of underes-
timation and undervaluation. When estimation and valuation tasks
were elicited in different blocks and based on separate (but identical)
samples, there was no significant correlation between the mean of per-
centage deviations for each participant in both tasks (r = .11, p = .13).
Further, the Spearman correlation between the numeracy score and
the participant mean deviation was r = .13 (p = .076) in the estimation
task and r = −.05 (p = .710) in the valuation task. We conclude that
in this experiment the evidence for an individual tendency to under-
estimate and undervalue remains inconclusive. Overall, trial-by-trial
variability seemed to be very strong, which impeded the correlation of
individual differences between tasks (Rouder, Kumar, & Haaf, 2019).
6 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
To summarize the results across all experiments, we combined and
analyzed the data in an internal meta-analysis. The overall sample
size was 454, and all previously reported effects were significant for
both valuation and estimation. Estimation effects were smaller than
valuation effects but were always in the same direction. To quantify
the degree to which estimation resembled valuation, we used the ratio
(estimation/valuation) of each respective effect.
Across all experiments, the overall ratio of underestimation to
undervaluation was 19%. Taking the difference in answers between
low- (SD = 5) and high-variance (SD = 20) sequences separately for
the two tasks yielded a ratio of 27%. Finally, taking the difference
in answers between left- and right-skewed distributed sequences
separately for the two tasks yielded a ratio of 48%. This means that
the greatest similarity in the size of the effect between the estimation
and valuation tasks was found in the effect of the skewness.6 The
ratios across all experiments, as well as separately for each experiment
where the particular effect was manipulated, are presented in Figure 5.
7 GENERAL DISCUSSION
In examining experience-based valuations of gambles with continuous
outcome distributions, we found that people showed risk aversion.
They gave valuations below the sequence means, and valuations were
lower for high- than for low-variance sequences. In addition, par-
ticipants valued right-skewed higher than left-skewed distributions.
These results disconfirm the hypotheses that underweighting rare
events and overweighting extreme events generalize to valuations of
continuous outcomes. We found a similar qualitative, though less pro-
nounced, pattern in a task where participants estimated the mean of a
sequence, and economic preferences for risk or skewness should play
no role. This shows that the characteristics of a number distribution
affect the perception and integration of numeric information beyond
the narrow area of economic valuation under risk and uncertainty.
The behavioral effects, as well as the similarity between valuations
6 We do not report the ratio for the mean, because as shown in Experiment 2, this effect
vanishes once we hold the variation (instead of the variance) constant.
and estimations, are consistent with the idea that numeric cognition is
subject to a compressed mental number line (Feigenson et al. 2004).
Consequently, economic valuations of gambles could be shaped partly
(20% to nearly 50%, according to our data) by regularities in numeric
cognition rather than by subjective preferences alone.
7.1 Valuations versus choices from experience
The main difference between our study and those in the DFE literature
is that we elicited valuations of single number sequences, whereas
most previous studies asked people to choose between two number
sequences. In choice studies, people have tended to prefer higher
variance sequences, a behavior explained by the overweighting of high
numbers (Glickman et al. 2018; Konstantinidis et al. 2018; Ludvig &
Spetch, 2011; Spitzer et al. 2017; Tsetsos et al. 2012). This contrasts
with the lower valuations of high-variance sequences observed in our
experiments. Future research is needed to shed more light on this gap
between valuations and choice in DFE (see Golan & Ert, 2015). Crucial
differences between the two paradigms that could be relevant are
the number of streams the decider has to pay attention to (Vanunu,
Pachur, & Usher, 2019), the goal of the decider to come up with either
a precise monetary amount or to make an ordinal comparison, and the
attitude of the decider toward perceived (relative) losses (Ashby et al.
2018; Kunar et al. 2017).
Another regularity often found in choice studies of DFE is that
people behave as if they underweight rare events (Hertwig et al.
2004). This contrasts with the higher valuations observed in our
experiments for right-skewed distributions, with rare high outcomes,
than for left-skewed distributions, with rare small outcomes. Prior
choice studies that report underweighting of rare events have usually
used situations with one safe option and another option with two
outcomes. When participants have looked at pairwise options between
two-outcome gambles, their choices were more in line with attenuated
overweighting of rare events (Glöckner et al. 2016; Kellen et al. 2016).
In addition to the difference in elicitation format, unlike previous
studies, our experiments used continuous outcome sequences and,
thus, a different definition of rare events.
7.2 Valuations from experience and numeric
cognition
We found a statistically robust but small underestimation of the mean
of −1.72% across all experiments relative to the actual means of the
observed number sequences. This is consistent with recent research
(Brezis et al. 2015; Scheibehenne, 2019). Yet older studies did not
find such an effect and described people as intuitive statisticians
(e.g., Beach & Swenson, 1966; Laestadius Jr, 1970; Spencer, 1963). A
possible explanation for this discrepancy is that older studies focused
primarily on absolute or squared deviations from the mean and that
way did not measure estimation biases. In addition, older studies
typically had smaller numbers of participants; thus, the small effect size
of the underestimation might not have reached statistical significance.
Biased estimations of number sequences could result from an
intuitive number sense that guides the perception and integration
of numbers (Brezis et al. 2015; Feigenson et al. 2004; Gallistel &
Gelman, 2000). Because number perception and integration are part
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FIGURE 5 Relation of effects in
estimation and valuation across all
experiments. The x axis shows the
percentage deviation from the mean,
the difference in percentage
deviation between trials with
SD = 20 and SD = 5, and the
difference in percentage deviation
between trials with left- and
right-skewed distributions. In all
experiments, participants with more
than five estimates further away than
±5 SD from the true mean were
removed. Results are shown only for
experiments were the respective
manipulation was present (otherwise,
NA). The column ‘‘All’’ shows the
average values from all experiments
where data are available. Error bars
are standard errors of the mean
of economic valuation, this could explain similar qualitative patterns in
estimation and valuation (Schley & Peters, 2014). The mental number
line provides the best explanation for the effects we have observed,
as compared with other accounts derived from the DFE literature.
Whereas past research on the mental number line has predominantly
focused on nonsymbolic numerosities such as dot clouds (e.g. Dehaene
et al. 2008), our study is consistent with compression in symbolic
numbers. Future studies are needed to examine the differences and
similarities in compression between streams of symbolic numbers
and nonsymbolic numerosities in DFE (see Dutilh & Rieskamp, 2016;
Zeigenfuse et al. 2014).
As a limitation, we cannot conclude from the similarity between
estimation and valuation that mean estimates are direct antecedents
of valuations nor that valuations are causally influenced by numeric
cognition. For one, the individual correlation between estimation and
valuation was surprisingly small given the similar patterns in the
aggregate. Further, there are alternative explanations for the data. For
example, the effects in Experiment 3A could be due to anchor effects or
due to common-method biases, a task characteristic that has affected
both estimation and valuation similarly (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, &
Podsakoff, 2012). Moreover, we are not claiming that estimation and
valuation are identical. They are clearly different in that all effects
in estimation were smaller in size than the effects in valuation. This
difference could stem from the increased importance of distributional
characteristics like variance or skewness in preferential tasks. To
rigorously establish a causal link between numeric cognition and
economic valuation, a direct manipulation of the underlying cognitive
processes would be required.
7.3 The cognitive underpinning of preferences
The current research aims to add to the literature that explores the
cognitive underpinnings of economic preferences (Dertwinkel-Kalt
& Köster, 2020; Khaw et al. 2017; Lieder et al. 2018; Schley &
Peters, 2014). The DFE paradigm seems particularly useful to a better
understanding of how numeric information is processed to come up
with preferential decision making. One defining characteristic of this
task is that numeric information is presented sequentially and must be
stored in memory as it is usually not available at the time a decision
is made. Hence, memory effects can mediate behavioral characteris-
tics as, for example, the overweighting of extreme events (Kahneman
et al. 1993; Madan et al. 2014). The process of sequential number
integration can also be explicitly modeled through online-updating
or memory-based individual number recall (Erev et al. 2008; Mason
et al. 2019; Gonzalez et al. 2003). Future research is needed to link
these memory models to the compressed mental number line and
to examine whether compression differs depending on the number
of memory processes that are necessary to integrate numeric infor-
mation. Another class of cognitive models, range-frequency theory
and decision-by-sampling, examines how the distribution of individual
numbers shapes the perception of individual and summary evaluations
(Parducci et al. 1968; Stewart et al. 2006; Tripp & Brown, 2016). In
sum, a better understanding of how the context and memory processes
influence the valuation of numbers can inform models of preferential
decision making.
In general, processing numeric information requires cognitive
resources. To the extent that people differ in their cognitive abili-
ties, this could also affect preferential decision making (Ashby, 2017;
Dohmen et al. 2018). In the current studies, we found no conclusive
evidence of a relation between underestimation and numeracy. This
could be due to the small effect size of this correlation. However, it
could also mean that more refined cognitive models are necessary to
find a direct relation between cognitive ability and DFE. One important
point is that the numeracy questionnaire mostly asks about the under-
standing of probabilities, whereas no explicit probabilities have to be
calculated in DFE. Further, we are not aware of any research linking
the curvature of the mental number line to numeracy explicitly. Other
measures of cognitive ability may be more important to understanding
individual differences in DFE. Given the memory component present
in DFE, a plausible candidate could be working memory capacity, that
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is, the ability to store and manipulate items in short-term memory
(Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015).
Finally, many important laboratory studies about economic behav-
ior make use of the DFD paradigm (e.g., Holt & Laury, 2002; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992). Cognitive models could also help us better under-
stand behavioral differences between DFD and DFE by examining the
process of numeric integration. Whereas outcomes must be integrated
with probabilities when information is summarized descriptively, single
outcomes must be integrated when information is presented sequen-
tially. Thus, differences in the context of numbers presented and the
involvement of memory processes in DFE could lead to divergent
behavior in both paradigms. Future research is needed to synthesize
the above points through the integration of cognitive models into the
examination of preferential behavior in both DFD and DFE.
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